Jessica Moss, "Pistis, Belief, and Trust"

The Greek word ‘pistis’ begins as a word for trust in people or gods, and then takes a doxastic turn: in Plato it functions as a synonym for ‘doxa’ (opinion), and in Aristotle as a term for credence or conviction. We see something similar in English: ‘belief’ can refer to confidence/faith/trust (“I believe in you”) or the propositional attitude of taking-to-be-true. By tracing the history of pistis and its cognate verb and adjective (pisteueô and pistos), I show that in Greek at least this is not a change of meaning. ‘Pistis’ is univocal: it always means trust. In using the word for a doxastic attitude, Plato and Aristotle are developing an idea already long implied by the use of the verb and adjective. To trust a certain kind of entity – a claim, account, or story, or a thought or memory or visual appearance; in general, a representation with propositional content – is to take it to be true, i.e. to believe it.  I conclude by arguing that this is an appealing theory of propositional belief.